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Abstract—The paper outlines a behavioural theory of the fund management (FM) firm 
comprising, investment decisions (at stock and portfolio levels) by teams and individuals, and 
of an organisation process and contextual resource factors affecting decisions. FM 
organisational processes interacted with resources to enhance investment team decision 
conditions, costs and processes. Enhanced conditions and reduced decision costs were 
expected to improve the chances of FM success via new information production and better 
quality decisions. These dynamic elements to FM firms can be interpreted as tentative 
organisational means to deal with major problems of behaviour, uncertainty and information 
asymmetry at the heart of the valuation, investment, and performance problems facing FMs.  
Field research was conducted in 15 FM firms during 2004-2011. A grounded theory approach 
was employed in processing the data. This led to improvements in empirical understanding of 
behaviour within FM firms and markets. The results were discussed relative to relevant 
literature and previous grounded theory. This created a new conceptual tool to investigate FM 
underperformance and variety in FM styles. The paper demonstrated an empirically rich 
model of hierarchy, information production, capital allocation and other resource usage in 
financial institutions and discussed how this created further opportunities for research 
1. Introduction                             
Clarkson (1963), Holland and Doran (1998), Hellman (2000), Holland (2006) have revealed an 
embryonic grounded theory underlying FM structure and behaviour. This field based research has 
suggested that a more complete grounded theory of the fund management firm and of investment 
decisions making by its teams and individuals might underlie fund management behaviour.  The aim 
was to explore this possibility with a group of with fund managers and investment team members in 
15 large international fund management firms (FMs).  As a result the core research question 
concerned the following. How do fund manager firms organise and conduct decision making to 
create investment value?   The paper begins in section 2 with a brief summary of the literature. 
Section 3 discusses the research method.  Locke (2001. ch.7) comments that "the presentation of 
grounded theories similarly follows a format that involves the telling of theoretical elements and the 
showing of data fragments that instance them" and this format can be outlined as: summarise the 
theoretical frame -serially present each theoretical element well illustrated with data instances - 
summarise the theoretical frame. In section 4 the ‘big picture’ of the behavioural theory of fund 
management is briefly summarised. It is briefly interpreted using the analytic framework based on a 
set of theories and literature relevant to the FM phenomena. The results section (5 to 9) are presented 
in the order; – investment decision processes – resources – organisational processes –success and 
failure,  so as build up this ‘big’ picture from a micro view to the bigger picture. Each major results 
section (5 to 9) contains a succinct summary of the case results set within key grounded 
theory themes or elements, and these are discussed within relevant literature from the analytic 
framework. Section 5 explores action, behaviour and process in investment decision making 
by individuals and investment teams.  Section 6 outlines the nature of internal and external 
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contextual resources (or priors) for investment teams and their decision making.  Section 7 
develops a theoretical analysis of organisational processes. Section 8 discusses how FM 
organisational process and their properties of integration and coherence when combined with 
knowledge and narrative were unifying forces and had a direct influence on individuals and 
teams and their investment decisions. Section 9 uses the behavioural theory of FM to explore 
issues of FM success and failure and new ways of researching FM performance.  Section 10 
discusses conclusions, contributions and areas for further research. 
2. Literature review and Research problem     
In this section 2, historic literature and an analysis of current issues are used to establish the 
phenomena and problem area to be investigated. The literature is also used extensively in the 
results sections 5 to 9. The financial crisis during 2007-09 revealed many problems of 
understanding and learning by FM firms about their own business models and those of their 
investee companies (especially banks, Holland 2010). In addition, there has been poor 
financial performance by many FMs when delivering investment services to investors 
(Cuthbertson et al 2006, 2008). Environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues in equity 
investment decision making by fund managers (FMs) have become very high profile in the 
past decade.  Holland (2011) argues that Trustees, FM investors, and investee companies, all 
require shared knowledge - in the form of a grounded theory of FM - to overcome these 
problems. FM rating agencies and FM consultants employ their own proprietary and private 
conceptual framework to develop information and advice services to retail investors and to 
large FM clients such as pension fund trustees. The existence of much proprietary knowledge 
in the private world of FMs and external agents reveals the potential of grounded field work 
in understanding FM. However, the lack of broadly accepted and public knowledge about the 
FM business models has affected FM’s ability to disclose how their FM business model 
functions and hence the ability of stakeholders to hold them to account (‘Walker Review’, 
2009). Holland, (2006) notes the limits of conventional finance theory in explaining FMs and 
their performance. Historic field research by Clarkson (1963), Holland and Doran (1998), 
Hellman (2000), Holland (2006), revealed an embryonic grounded theory underlying FM 
structure and behaviour. However, the resulting theory of fund management was fragmented 
and lacked coherence. It did not address questions concerning wider organisation and process 
in fund management. It did not address questions about the role of knowledge and other 
resources in FM decision context and process, their roles in search for novel information of 
value in investment decisions and overall impact on performance. It did not address the 
dynamic nature of FM, or issues of variety in FM. 
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3.  Research  methods                      
Given previous research and the nature of the research questions on fund management, a 
grounded theory approach was adopted to processing the case data (Locke, 2001). The data 
collection process was conducted in two phases. Phase 1 of the research involved collecting 
archival data on each case FM firm. Recent public announcements, web sources, financial 
statements, and private presentations to trustees were collected directly from the FM firms 
prior to the interview. Phase 2 involved interviews during 2004-2011 with senior fund 
managers and investment team members in 15 large international fund management firms 
(FMs)  (see Appendix 1 for details). These FMs operated in Edinburgh, Glasgow, London, 
Frankfurt, Tokyo and other world financial centres. Senior fund managers and active 
members of their investment teams were interviewed. Their time was scarce and this 
restricted the interviews to 1.5 to 2 hours length in each organisation.  The cases were chosen 
because of their common type of investment behaviour as active (very large) fund manager 
firms with an emphasis on the production of fundamentals information. Variation existed 
within the case FMs in terms of their FM style, type or the nature of FM ‘activity’. Thus 
‘value’, ‘growth’, and ‘special situation’ FMs were present in the sample. This multi-case 
design created opportunities for identifying common themes and differences across the cases 
(Yin, 1994). Four of the UK FM firms had already been extensively interviewed, on two 
separate occasions, during 1993 to 2000 (Holland and Doran, 1998; Holland, 2006). 
Membership by the researcher of a trustee investment committee over the study period meant 
that four UK FMs interviewed as a part of the new study formed much more detailed 
longitudinal cases. Thus eight FM firms provided very detailed data, and seven FMs 
provided substantial interview and archival data. The aim was not to provide ‘statistical 
generalisation’ as in more conventional hypothetical- deductive research (Ryan et al, 2002).  
The aim was to generate enough FM cases and data to create the conditions for ‘theoretical 
saturation’ as recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1998, p143). Similar sample sizes had 
proved sufficient in previous related FM grounded theory work (Holland and Doran, 1998; 
Holland, 2006). 
The interview questions were semi structured and designed to allow the participants to 
interpret and describe the phenomena in their own way (Bryman, 1988, Buchanan, 1993). 
Previous grounded research work and the literature (Holland and Doran, 1998; Holland, 
2006)) helped define these questions.  The core research question concerned the following. 
How do fund manager firms organise and conduct decision making to create investment 
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value? The specific interview questions focussed on FM investment decisions and the role of 
FM contexts, processes, resources such as FM knowledge, and the use of information in 
creating value in investment decisions. They included the following questions. What are the 
key tasks in stock selection and asset allocation? What information sources are used? How 
do you use company and market information in your investment decisions? What FM firm 
and team attributes or individual factors support decisions?  How do you organise and 
acquire advantages for information production and investment decision making? How do 
these contextual areas, organisational processes and changes in them affect decision 
making? How do they affect FM type and FM performance? The questions were focused on 
equity investment rather than a wide of asset classes. This simplified the data collection and 
processing and provided a comparable base across the cases.  
McKinnon (1988) and Stoner and Holland (2004) argued that explicit strategies should be 
developed to counter threats to validity and reliability whilst collecting data in field studies. In this 
research, counter checks were made between the interview data and archival sources. These 
included checks against FM private presentation slides or against archival sources for publicly 
observable events. Multiple cases offered opportunities to explore how FMs and other market 
participants viewed  investment related events for other case FMs. Parallel research work with  
company managers over the same period (Holland, 2001, 2005, 2009) provided opportunities to 
cross check corporate views on  FM resources, capabilities, decisions and their influence over 
companies and markets.  
 During data processing, case data and the emergent empirical patterns interacted in iterative 
relationships. This was mediated by an analytic framework and prior grounded theory. The 
analytic framework was based on a set of theories and literature relevant to the FM phenomena. 
The analytic framework reflected a medium prior level of theoretisation (Laughlin, 1995) about the 
phenomena. The paper constitutes an exercise in ‘theoretical sensitivity’ whereby new work allows 
the author to return to the original data with a new perspective (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The 
main phenomena or core code was FM investment decisions by individuals, in teams, in FM firms. 
Core interaction categories concerned ‘dynamics’ or ‘ongoing organisational processes, contextual 
resources, immediate investment decisions, consequences and immediate feedback’. The paper 
develops a behavioural theory of fund management that integrates these factors. This expanded, 
developed and provided new detailed insights into the original FM   ‘action and behaviour’ 
grounded theory models (Holland and Doran (1998), and Holland (2006) by showing how they 
involved more elaborate contextual structures,  processes and dynamic relations. 
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4.  Behavioural theory if the FM firm -brief theoretical and empirical view: 
 
The behavioural theory of the fund management firm was firstly, a set of relational concepts 
involving ongoing FM decision action, and broader organisational process and hierarchy. 
Secondly, it was a set of FM strategic and contextual resources, and their properties. Figure 1 
illustrates the core empirical constructs and findings.   Immediate decision actions by 
individuals and teams were a goal seeking structured task sequence and a process of sense 
making. These were different but related means to reduce the uncertainty associated with 
equity investments (Hellman, p236, 2000) and to find new information and investments of 
value.  
The FM organisational processes were identified in the grounded theory data processing as 
two broad process categories. Firstly, as an integrated set of hierarchical processes or firm 
wide processes of control and influence over the allocation of resources, risk and autonomy. 
Secondly they existed as firm wide and team information production and exchange processes.  
FM firm wide organisational processes were key means for uncertainty avoidance and 
conflict resolution in the manner suggested by Cyert and March (1963). They were means to 
create and control hierarchy costs (Stein, 2002).  They were also the base from which 
creativity could be stimulated. Both informal ‘conversations’ and formal communications 
were important in micro and macro processes. Gratton (2002) and Weick (1998) note their 
role in solving problems, and making novel associations. The organisational processes 
mobilised FM resources in a dynamic and purposeful way to produce the desired influence on 
investment team conditions and ongoing decision processes. 
Resources were interpreted as knowledge based key properties of FM internal and external 
contexts. The external context of FMs consisted of various external ‘networks’ and markets. 
The internal context of FMs consisted of top management context, an organisational context, 
a team context, a personal context, and an immediate decision or action context. Each FM 
context had various knowledge based properties and peer group relative strengths of these 
properties.  From the resource based view of the firm (Barney,1991; Fahy, 2000) the FM 
contexts and their knowledge based properties were resources mobilised by FM 
organisational processes to support investment team processes. The key resources were 
central to  FMs exploiting investment opportunities and creating value, as well as in  
uncertainty avoidance and conflict resolution processes as outlined by Cyert and March 
(1963).  
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Creativity was an important part of FM investment decision making process and was built on 
prior order (decision and organisation) and existing resources to develop creative properties 
to their decision processes and contexts (Nonaka & Toyama, (2005), Ford and Gioia (2000), 
Holland et al (2012)). Simon’s (1957) ideas and the ‘behavioural theory of the firm’ (Cyert 
and March, 1963) were used to interpret FM firm and team behaviour.  Developments in 
‘behavioral finance’ (Shefrin and Statman, (1985), Tversky and Kahneman (1992)) were 
used to explore FM investment decision behaviour (by individuals and teams) in markets.  
 
Figure 1. The behavioural theory of the fund management firm  
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5.1 Theoretical analysis of routine investment decision making and of dynamics. 
  The dynamic nature of investment decision making process in the case FMs was interpreted in 
literature in two related ways. Firstly as goal seeking, routine investment decision process with a 
structured task sequence with this set in an organisational context (Cyert and March, 1963). The 
routine FM stock selection decision processes had similar structural features to those found by 
Bouwman et al (1987, 1995) for financial analysts and those found by Holland and Doran 
(1998) and Holland (2006) for FMs. Secondly, as a process of sense making (Weick, 1979) and 
of interpretation. According to Weick (1995), ´ Sense making is the search for contexts within 
(which) small details fit together and make sense… It is a continuous alteration between 
particulars and explanations, with each cycle giving added form and substance to the other. It is 
about building confidence as the particulars begin to cohere and as the explanation allows 
increasingly accurate deductions. (Weick, 1995, p. 133) 
The structured routines and sense making occurred together as one dynamic process at the level 
of FM individuals and teams. For example, during routine and structured investment decisions, 
FMs (teams and individuals) used ‘hard’ or quantitative information created during screening 
and analysis to test and evaluate investment alternatives (at stock, and portfolio levels). In such 
situations they ‘managed the argument’ and created extra information by proposing alternatives 
in the form of say hypothesis and counter hypothesis (Bolton, 2008). These alternatives were 
assessed against ‘just enough’ information within the FM’s own theory, criteria, heuristics, 
categories or themes etc. The FM teams and individuals also employed ‘just enough’ 
fundamental analysis relative to assumptions of a ‘near’ efficient market. Simon’s (1957) ideas 
of ‘bounded rationality’ and satisficing’ were relevant to explain such FM investment decision 
behaviour.  The case FMs employed subjective analysis when interpreting the behaviour of 
investors, the market, investee companies, and their own behaviour and emotions. This ‘soft’ 
information was combined with ‘hard’ information about company financial performance and 
market return and risk. The FM ‘weighed’ their objective and subjective views in an informed 
manner and reflected about these differing views. The latter refers to a form of ‘metacognition’ 
(Flavell, 1979) whereby individuals and teams demonstrated capabilities to assess their own 
knowledge (objective, subjective). In stock selection this joint processing of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ 
(Stein, 2002, Chen et al, 2004) information led to enhanced  FM  understanding, meaning   and 
confidence in the FM  ‘mosaic’ about company value creation and in the identification of 
‘nuggets’ of value relevant information (Holland, 2006).   This in turn created the conditions for 
choice between the merits of the competing hypotheses and for immediate or deferred 
investment action and behaviour.  
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Case FM 3:  ‘The mosaic that we get reflects the need to cobble together fragments of information from many sources. However, you can over-
extrapolate the picture you get from this. It is dangerous to over-interpret these fragments. If we get a consensus on our suspicions about a company, 
then, okay we can act but this is not a deterministic approach. We then vote in our teams and try to pull together the collective view of all these 
sources of fragments of data into a vote about a particular stock and this, therefore, informs our buy/hold decisions. It forms the context for the fair 
value less market value gap analysis, and our decision to buy, hold or sell’. 
 
Both the routine investment  task sequence  and sense making reveal different but related 
insights into the phenomena of inductive, iterative, pattern seeking cycle evident in actual FM 
decision making.  The first provides insights into the order or structured dimension of decisions 
and the second builds on this order to reveal more about interpretation of information and the 
creation of meaning within such a set of tasks. Both structure and sense making were joint 
dynamic means to cope with and reduce the uncertainty associated with equity investments 
(Hellman, p236, 2000) and to find new information and investments of value. The joint use of 
structured fundamental analysis and of ‘sense making’ reflects the resource based view of the 
firm (RBV as in Barney, 1991) as FMs sought to create and exploit a knowledge based 
sustainable competitive advantage in decision making routines. 
5.2 Broad nature of the investment decision process and context 
Major properties of the immediate FM decision context included the degree of structure and the 
flexibility of investment decision routines, tasks, and the working day. It included the formality of 
risk controls. The case FMs developed structured estimation, valuation and risk control decision 
processes for ‘bottom up’ stock selection and ‘top down’ portfolio decisions.  In stock selection, 
the FMs sought to acquire a special information edge by directly collecting information in private 
from their investee companies. In asset allocation they sought advantage by generating their own 
private information about currencies, economies and sectors, as well as in financial markets. In 
both investment decisions they sought to combine this private information with public information 
to create advantage (Holland, 2006). Routine involved the predictable structure of part of the 
working day and of formal meetings and communications, as well as structured investment 
decisions. The FMs also ensured that their structured FM decision processes were responsive and 
adaptable to major external events such as a sudden stock market change or political events. Thus 
asset allocation, sector decisions, and stock selection were also designed to be compressed into a 
very short crisis period instead of a more normal monthly, weekly, and daily cycle. 
5.3 The immediate FM decision context was a structured world of ongoing action.  
In FMs the world of ongoing action focussed on stimuli, interpretation, new information 
production, judgment, investment decision actions, consequences and feedback. It included the 
starting (current) financial position for the funds.  The investment decision routine was the main 
focus for decision making action and fund outcomes.   
In the case FMs the key organisational areas for investment decisions included: 
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• ‘Top down’ macro analysis, assessment of countries, global sectors, currency and 
economy risks, diversification possibilities,  
• Using quantitative and qualitative analysis of currency, country and sector risks to 
adjust the forward looking view. 
 
• ‘Top down’ Asset allocation decisions based on above – as a monthly or six week 
process – an investment committee of senior  investment staff making choices about: 
- all forms of investment assets and relative asset weightings, and a risk budget  
- all equity elements and relative sector weightings, and other asset allocation issues 
such as geographic weightings, and a risk budget 
- and hence construction of a model portfolio from the top down. This could be an 
explicit or implicit model portfolio. 
 
• ‘Bottom up’ Stock selection and construction of the portfolio – as a daily process – by 
individuals and investment teams managing specialist funds. 
 
Case FM 3 provides insights into both ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ investment decision areas. 
Case FM 3:   and ‘top down’ asset allocation 
‘Every month or so … we get the economy forecasts and currency forecasts and political views expected and this broadly helps us determine 
the asset allocation between bonds, equities, cash, properties  ...and currencies that we think are desirable ...for our customers.  
…….This is just a big pie of funds and is the size of funds for the equity pool. It does not necessarily determine their actual composition. 
This is really the bottom up process …. 
 
Case FM 3:  and ‘bottom up’ stock selection. 
‘We look at the universe of all possible companies in global sectors, maybe 2000 large companies. Our first screen is to remove companies 
with the lowest scores on growth, quality and other factors and  reduce to 500 stocks.  …do a second screen to analyse these... and .... get 
down to 150 to 200 stocks. … do a detailed growth, quality, and valuation analysis for every stock, and score and vote each stock in the 
team, and come to our preferred list of stocks for the portfolio. 
…The detailed analysis uses lots of different types of information. …You can think of a circle in which many material, non-public 
information sources from companies are feeding into our mosaic. These can be the company or analysts’ meetings…and more fundamental 
sources like retail stores. We talk to suppliers and buyers. All, these feed into this circle to get our mosaic … our full picture and this is 
where we get our profit . This is where we get  fair value and  compare with market value and see  the differences. This  influences our 
degree of conviction about fair value. 
 
Many interactions and iterations arose between the ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ approaches 
within their daily and monthly cycles FM (and in Holland, 2006).  For example, the degree of 
control by ‘top down’ of the ‘bottom up’ approach (or vice versa) depended on where the FM 
thought the preponderance of value came from. Information flows from ‘top down’,  ‘bottom 
up’ and ‘cross hierarchy’ organisational directions altered viewpoints and ideas of risk and 
return at stock and portfolio levels. The processes were used to adapt the ‘top down’ model 
portfolio to client specific needs for risk, return and liquidity. The ‘top down’ model portfolio 
could be used for guidance on the allowed value range for sector decisions and stock 
selection decisions. Stock selection operated within the sector weightings and risk controls 
from the top down view. Stock selection decisions provided inputs to new asset allocation 
decision over time such as new information arose on changes at company and sector levels 
and these suggested change in future asset allocations. The cross hierarchy, top down and 
bottom up approaches operated within predictable daily and monthly cycles but were adjusted 
by new information, when they exceeded risk budgets, and when circumstances required a 
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quick response. 
Case FM 4 provides insights into the ‘Top down’ and ‘bottom up’ interactions and organisational decision process 
.’.So, we have a daily and weekly bottom up process coming from stock selection and sector allocation and sector decisions. These meet in 
the middle with this top down asset allocation for bonds, equity and cash.  
….At this mid- point there is a considerable iterative process within a month. ..  we may find that there is a risk overlay here from the Barra 
portfolio risk model which may say that the sectors and their stock composition ..  are too risky ..we may decide to change these decisions 
because they are just outside our risk budget.. or tracking error.  .  
…..But also, within the month, there may be changes in the macro world which may be making a sector more or less attractive …and this 
may make us slightly alter the overall bottom up position. There can be major changes here if the macro data suggests that or there are major 
changes with a big company’ 
 
Success in the above interactions between stock selection and portfolio decisions required 
much support from organisational processes and resources in the FM firm. The case FMs 
needed to create desirable conditions within individuals, within and between  and teams, 
cross hierarchy, and up and down the hierarchy, such that knowledge and information were 
actively created, exchanged and used, in a manner consistent with investment aims.  In 
section 6 the nature of resources at individual, team and firm are discussed. Sections 7 and 8 
illustrate how organisational processes within hierarchy were used to mobilise these 
resources to create desirable conditions and processes in investment teams and individuals. 
6.  Resources, contexts and investment decision making             
Section 6 outlines the role of resources available in internal and external contexts and in 
investment teams and their decision making process and actions. Value was created by 
mobilising and transforming resources in purposeful organisational processes and team 
investment decision processes set within hierarchy.   The external context of FMs consisted 
of various external ‘networks’, markets, and ‘chains’ of accountability. The internal context 
of FMs consisted, inter alia, of a strategic or top management context, an organisational 
context, a team context, a personal context, and an immediate decision or action context. 
Each context had various properties and peer group relative strengths of these properties.   
The FM contexts and their knowledge based properties were interpreted as key resources 
(Barney,1991; Fahy, 2000)  which supported FM organisational and investment team processes. 
The key resources were central to  FMs exploiting investment opportunities and creating value, 
as well as in  uncertainty avoidance and conflict resolution processes outlined by Cyert and 
March (1963). FM firm contextual properties or resources such as knowledge, ‘matching’, and 
‘coherence’, constituted a form of ‘collective mindfulness’ (Weick 1979, 1995) designed to 
reduce ‘the perceived level of equivocality’ to reduce many possible meanings for FM teams 
and individuals. These ideas relate individual and team experiences to organisational contexts 
and to concepts of uncertainty avoidance in the team and firm. 
High strengths of the properties of contexts relative to internal needs and external competitors 
can be interpreted as excess firm resources (or ‘slack’). These include high strengths of the 
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properties of FM organizational contexts in the form of knowledge, coherence and matching.  
These include high strengths of the properties of FM teams and individuals.  High quality 
resources also included substantial financial reserves and the quality of tangibles such as 
technology and offices. The primary role of excess resources was to provide competitively 
superior means to support the exploitation of opportunities and to act as a superior buffer to 
counter threats and risk. The excess resources or ‘slack’ were the basis for a sustainable 
competitive advantage. They were designed to help the FM outperform other FM firms, 
teams and portfolios and were a base from which innovation could arise. Many authors such 
as Penrose (1959), Cyert and March (1963), and Bourgeois (1981) employ similar concepts 
of slack and excess resources as the basis to form a sustainable competitive advantage. 
 6.1 The external context to FM  
The external contexts for investment decisions consisted of the wider social, political, 
economic environment of finance and investment. It also included the more immediate 
‘investment society’ and markets as external places for information search, investment action 
and for funding supply. Investment opportunities, constraints and FM performance contracts 
arose in this investment society. This was where the top management of the FM chose its 
preferred information niche, investment universe, risk universe, and investment goals for the 
whole firm and variations on these themes for specific investment teams and portfolios 
(Holland & Doran 1998; Holland, 2006). This was where the FM thought it could acquire 
information, and understand how value was created. This was where it believed it could 
deliver performance.  
Various forms of organisation arose in the FM external environment including external 
‘networks’ in  financial markets and could play a role in privileged access to information. 
Case FM 3;  ‘..in..Germany….fund managers assume that the stock market is rigged… lots of insiders. … they believe, the government 
helps investment bankers and others with…access to private information about initial public offerings of denationalised companies. In the 
UK you get the house brokers who have prior access to companies and,. … know more about the company earnings and the forecast than 
anybody else., …The US market is more efficient and has tougher regulation like FD2000…Much of the time advantage has been lost now 
from concentrated marketplaces and….because of technology….. However, you can now get some of the insider access via ..one-on-ones 
with the companies’ 
 
The structured external environment also included ‘markets for information’ (Gonedes 1976, 
Keane 1983).  Clients, savers, consultants, FM rating agencies, companies, analysts, investors 
and other FMs, financial media, and regulators were a group of external actors that were 
connected in common networks. They formed a ‘market for information’ in which they 
exchanged information and created assurance for information users. Stable relationships in 
these networks were important information sources and rapid response means for FM 
investment teams. The ‘market for information’ reflected aspects of the regular micro 
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structural patterns and inter subjectivity described by Cetina and Bruegger (2002) ‘including 
the reciprocal interlocking of time dimensions among actors constituted as observers, 
conversation structures as a performative means for global transaction and relatedness, the 
structural use of interaction devices, … and the grounding of activities in a commerce of 
knowledge’.  Case FM 6 illustrates how this external world was a major source of investment 
information for FMs and their investment teams. 
Case FM 6: We think there are three or four categories of information from the outside world that are useful to fund management. 
….Companies report or announce information in public… and have extensive web sites. .... we visit over three thousand companies per year. 
…..Then there are the  media and financial database companies  .... we make extensive use of Bloomberg News and interpret what they say. 
We might read something in the Financial Times and develop a ‘thinking bubble’. ….We have a conversation with the marketplace… the 
marketplace itself  is very, very important to us. We get information from the sell-side analysts  and…other fund managers.. ..our .. 
market traders …help us price a transaction... understand what is going on in the market...  
 
The external context also included established and shared knowledge in the wider 
professional and academic communities (Mackenzie, 2006).  This included professional 
knowledge (such as the ‘5Ps of investment’) and academic knowledge on how markets 
worked (Efficient markets, MPT, asset pricing, behavioural finance etc), how to value 
companies (valuation theory such as NPV, strategic option pricing etc), and knowledge on 
how companies created value (eg RBV or  Porter 5 forces etc). 
6.2 Individual and team contexts and resources for decision making processes.    
Properties of individuals and their strengths created a personal context and resources for action. 
This context was supported by FM firm and team contextual factors.  Desirable individual FM 
characteristics included personal knowledge (know-how). They involved high ‘knowledge of 
oneself’ or awareness of the limitations and possibilities of own individual capabilities and 
psychological traits (say in different cycles or circumstances) and biases. The latter ability to assess 
one’s own subjective and objective knowledge and the ability to encourage one’s own explicit 
learning can be seen in rare FM ‘stars’ (as in Bolton, 2008), or more generally as ‘metacognition’, 
Flavell, (1979). Desirable personal features also included: the ability and desire to adapt and learn 
from mistakes; deep personal commitment to and focus on the information search and investment 
tasks; a search for excellence; and psychological characteristics such as levels of confidence. 
Personal job incentives were a function of individual traits as well as characteristics of their FM 
team and FM organisational incentive schemes.   
FM case 5: Human capital skills are very important in stock selection and asset allocation. We need staff with the energy to keep hunting…. with the 
drive to look for ideas. Sometimes there are none. ..available ... but we need to keep going because they do not fall into our lap... the key is 
motivation . Our people are incentivised and they want to put the energy into do these things…. professional exams.. gives our staff the skills to talk 
to the brokers’ analysts and the companies.. …. they can do the fundamental accounting analysis. 
 
The investment team context, in part, reflected combinations of the personal contexts of 
individuals and their individual knowledge, skills, experience, and psychological tendencies such 
as overconfidence, confirmation bias, and framing (Statman, 1999). It also reflected the unique 
context and properties formed by the group and group processes which exploited individual 
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characteristics (Gratton, 2002).  This included features such as shared vision or shared beliefs 
about the tasks in hand, and a shared commitment to learning about new types of investment, 
circumstances and responses (Lord, 2014). Variety in psychological characteristics of individuals 
(and overconfidence, confirmation, framing), and knowledge have been recognised as problems of 
reasoning (or irrationality) in individuals (Mercier, Sperber, 2011). They were also the basis for a 
variety of viewpoints and for robust argument in teams (Mercier, Sperber, 2011).   
In FM firms, the unique properties of the team context reflected the degree of organisation of team 
interactions; for high quality argument; for exchanges of information and for joint production of 
information (active ‘conversations’ in team); and for reaching consensus decisions or for allowing 
individual choice. The team context was also influenced by factors such as the degree of shared 
pay and other incentive schemes, variety of skills, experience and psychological outlooks, degree 
of hierarchy and control and many other factors. The team context reflected the layout of the FM 
team room to ensure they were all close together on one physical space.  The team context also 
reflected the formal schedule of meetings. The nature of weekly and cyclic meetings, with clear 
information exchange and decision purposes, with formal information exchange arrangements 
between geographic and sector teams or specialists, were expected to affect the performance of 
investment teams. 
Team contextual factors as resources were intended to enhance conditions and processes in various 
investment teams (investment committees, teams managing specific funds) as well as the 
conditions between them.  These included team conditions such as trust, consensus, understanding, 
and focus on task. They included group behaviour, shared understandings, degree conflict allowed, 
and shared purpose in teams.   
Case FM 7:   In terms of personality of FMs we need trust within and between our FM teams. We need to be sure that our individual FMs will do 
what said they will do. We need this trust and honesty in our individuals and teams to be able to work together really well. We need it to ensure that 
trustees trust us… 
 
Team resources such as shared knowledge were intended to help support individual characteristics 
in the desired direction.  For example team factors were intended to enhance individual’s ability to 
assess their own subjective and objective knowledge, or to enhance their ‘metacognition’ (Flavell, 
1979). 
Case FM 13: …the best team is a blend of, solid, uninspiring number-crunchers and… flair people. The flair people give the momentum and drive 
for a decision.. … we need Scottish dourness, the pragmatism and common sense here.  and we need team leaders with the management skill who 
know when to do nothing and who know when to keep it going slowly but surely. … we need the odd eccentric.... question the status quo ….we 
prefer an eclectic mix of arts and science people, not just finance graduates. do not want any dogmatic ways of looking at the world….we know we 
need the right blend of experience, temperament, and style.... it is a very subjective decision here. 
 
6.3   Strategic and organisational resources for decisions by teams. 
The internal FM strategic context was manifest as FM philosophy, FM top management and board 
knowledge and capabilities, core beliefs, and shared values. It was also manifest as FM firm aims 
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(goals) and strategic choices about FM organisation and process. Strategic context gave clear 
purpose to operational investment decisions by investment teams. Variation in the strategic contexts 
was the one of the primary contextual driver of differences in FM style or peer group type. 
Case FM 3: ‘Key to our equity philosophy is our belief that rigorous fundamental research of equity securities, integrated with a disciplined and 
consistent valuation approach will allow us to outperform benchmark portfolios and with a below average risk position.  This fundamental, stock 
selection approach focuses on stocks of  high quality growth companies with higher than average long-term growth potential’. 
 
Matching factors linked strategic context to external context and were outcomes of an FM SWOT 
analysis  whereby the FM assessed its strengths and weaknesses, threats and opportunities, relative to 
competitors in their competitive environment. FMs sought to create difficult to copy, rare and 
difficult to substitute resources (Barney 1991). FM matching involved the perceived match of key 
elements (such as FM philosophy, organizational and team structure and process), and their 
properties to FM external assets such as reputation, to FM risks taken (and chosen information niche, 
investment universe and landscape) and to a wide range of potential circumstances (economic and 
competitive) for the present and long term.  
Case FM 4 ‘Size matters. We recognises our resource limitations and, therefore, make a decision to match the scale and complexity of our organisation 
structure and investment decision processes to reflect the complexity of our investment universe and markets and the skills and limits of our teams and 
individuals…… 
 
Coherence factors linked strategic context to operational context. Coherence or integration factors in 
FM firms included categories such as the degree of co-ordination or linkage between key strategic 
intangibles such FM philosophy and knowledge, and shared aims.  Coherence can be interpreted as a 
key dimension of organisational culture (Schein, 1989). In FMs, organisational culture included FM 
firm wide shared beliefs (about companies, markets and the FM), implicit values, perceptions, 
common norms of behaviour in the FM (eg focus on the client), and their collective impact on 
individuals’ thinking, feelings and behaviour in investment teams.  These elements were at the heart 
of coherence.  
Case FM 11 :  ‘The  culture  of the fund management firm is vital. This affects attitudes to risk and ..over-weighting  and…affect attitudes to 
companies. …Here  at XXXX we are long established.. family firm. We … are  here for  the  long term. We don't have a hire and fire culture. People 
join us for their whole career.  We very rarely lose staff.  Staff believe that this is a …worthwhile job and, of course, XXXX  …. has a very high 
reputation’. 
 
The internal organisational context included the FM internal organisational structure and hierarchy or 
internal places for investment action as well as firm level, investment team and fund level goals. It 
involved formal investment decision processes set within formal organisational structure. It included 
formal recruitment, training and in some cases, formal knowledge management functions and 
processes.  At operational levels, it included ‘front office’ layout and ‘back office’ support functions. 
Front office functions and team functions included portfolio and stock investment decisions, research 
and analysis, traders, and customer and client relations management.  ‘Back office’ included: 
performance measurement; customer and client reporting, technology and decision support; 
transaction execution and management; treasury and funds administration; and reporting of risk and 
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performance to regulators and the public. Highly disciplined ‘back office’ support functions and IT 
infrastructure were designed to provide operational support to investment teams and their investment 
decisions. The operational context also consisted inter alia, of formal control and communication 
systems, regular and scheduled meetings, standard risk control technology, and risk control 
procedures at fund, individual, team, and firm levels. The operational context provided order and 
predictable form to the investment decision process and day. Case FM 4 reveals the form that 
‘organisation’ can take in a FM firm and its impact on decisions in teams.  
Case FM 4: ‘The overall organisation of our European equity process is based upon several connected parts…..the European equity’s Chief Investment 
Officer ...oversees the team and process across sectors and ensures consistency in implementation for client portfolios.….We have nine ... analysts 
dealing with sectors. ..asset managers are responsible for deriving our European equities investment strategy. They undertake sector and company 
research. They generate the stock selection ‘alpha’ . They do some portfolio management by managing three to seven sectors per team .... These are all 
supported by teams for quantitative analysis... They maintain the input models for stock valuation or bottom up processes, and the model portfolios for 
diversification and risk budget for top down process.. ….The investment process is also supported by the order desk which implements all transactions 
undertaken for client portfolios.  
 
6.4 FM knowledge as key resources.  
 
FM firms had little in the way of physical or tangibles assets. Their core functions and competitive 
advantage were based primarily on knowledge intensive intangible assets and capabilities at firm, 
team and individual levels. These can be interpreted as human, structural and relational forms of 
intellectual capital (Meritum, 2002). The use of knowledge in this way reflected the resource based 
view of the firm (Barney, 1991).  Extensive knowledge use, as well as implicit knowledge creation 
and knowledge management were often at the heart of ongoing FM investment activities.  FM 
knowledge was key property or resource in its own right and was part of other properties of FM 
organisation, teams, and individual contexts. The organisational process in the FM firm depended on 
knowledge and its impact on ongoing decision activities at fund, team and individual levels. As a 
result, much knowledge of the environment, investment society, markets, corporate value creation, 
and of investment process, was employed by FMs (individuals and teams) during their investment 
decisions in specific funds under management. This knowledge was developed in the case FMs 
during the investment decision making (routine and creative) process and during longer term learning 
(Holland et al, 2012).  The knowledge of internal and external contexts was in part ‘owned’ as 
intangible assets by FMs as individuals, teams and firms. This knowledge or intellectual capital 
(Meritum, 2002) existed as cognitive states in individuals, as explicit and implicit properties of the 
capabilities of individuals and teams, as properties of FM context and process, and as formal FM firm 
knowledge about such knowledge and how to use it. The knowledge existed formally in the case FM 
firms' training manuals and information systems (Holland, 2006). This knowledge was shared at 
various levels, with say top management skills and experience of many cycles transmitted to teams 
and individuals managing funds.  This extended the skills of teams and individuals and enhanced 
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their capabilities to take investment decisions and generate fund performance. High strength of a 
property such as organisational order or creativity was based in part on its knowledge characteristics 
such as uniqueness, being valuable, being difficult to copy, and high FM ability to exploit, all relative 
to competition from other FMs or investment teams in the FM’s peer group.  This reflected the 
resource based view of the firm (Barney, 1991).   
FM own knowledge took many forms in internal and external contexts. Prior FM knowledge about 
company value creation (Holland et al 2012) was crucial to investment decision activities in the FM. 
This knowledge included FM theory of company value creation in competitive markets. It included 
FM knowledge of corporate financial accounting, financial reporting and other disclosure forms and 
content and how these related to the company business model and parameters in FM valuation 
models.  FM knowledge about companies and markets was often expressed as stable decision 
heuristics. These were categories of special types of firms, operating in special market and/or 
economic circumstances, when combined were likely to have value potential. Examples included 
categories such as ‘special situations’  ‘themes’, ‘value’ and ‘growth’. They were use to screen and 
focus information search in a world of ‘information overload’. These heuristics reflected ‘bounded 
rationality’ (Simon, 1976) at the level of many individuals in investment teams across the FM firm. 
Case FM 15: ‘Special situations’ can be seen as a flexible but changeable set of broad categories for searching for and identifying companies with 
potential for value. They are an input to stock selection and are of considerable use in prior screening of candidate companies before major research 
resources are devoted to intensive analysis of the company. The existing portfolio is mainly made up of companies in these categories and hence is an 
output both of Special Situation screening and detailed stock level analysis’. 
 
 7. The FM organisational process and contexts                
Section 7 outlines the FM organisational processes in the case FMs. The FM organisational 
processes were identified in the grounded theory data processing in the case FMs as two broad 
process categories operating within the FM hierarchy. Firstly, as an integrated set of hierarchical 
processes or firm wide processes of control and influence. These included control processes which 
were used as the organising means to control behaviour, risk, incentives, and degree of 
independence at all levels in FM firm. They included control and development processes over 
knowledge and other resources. They included hierarchical control over the allocation of 
resources. Secondly they existed as firm wide and team information production and exchange 
processes.  The latter included information production processes as the organising means (at all 
organisation, team, individual levels) to narrow down the focus of the search for information on 
risk and return. The two sets of connected and overlapping organisational processes created the 
support means for investment teams and their decisions and actions. They were designed to 
augment the quality of investment decision making, to control risk in these investment teams, and 
to improve their probability of success in investment decisions. 
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Case FM 2: The key input is our philosophy or our long term and fundamental views on risk and return ….This deals with ....exposure and risk we 
are prepared to take... number of stocks in our portfolios, the weightings, weighting limits, and the tracking error for the.. portfolio. These reflect 
customer needs and our risk preferences. .. this is a long term input to fund management. …..We also have our organisation structure, ... our board, 
senior management and asset allocation committees….We encourage independence in our individuals in... investment decision ... we also control 
individuals through various committees and  team approach to stock selection and asset allocation decisions. ….We have risk controls... a model 
portfolio for the whole firm,  and  benchmark portfolios for clients….We have firm wide control …over the risks ..from investment teams. ... bottom 
up investment process... is placed in the context of the top down processes.  Another factor interacting here is our technology support for the 
strategic structures and processes and for the immediate ongoing decision activities. …..All of these factors interact with our shared beliefs and 
preferences during investment decisions.  
The FM firms had many FM purposeful drivers to the organisational process. These included firm 
culture, philosophy, and investment policy (or risk return preferences) and firm wide investment 
goals. This context included prior strategic choices on preferred information niches, class of 
investment products, and investment and risk universe to match policy.  It included prior strategic 
choices about organisation processes and contextual resources.  Within this strategic context, 
established FM organisational process and resources played a central role in supporting teams and 
their ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ investment decision processes. 
Co-ordinated organisation processes were essential for effective functioning in the FM. They were 
based on FM wide strengths such as explicit and broadly understood FM philosophy, culture, and 
shared beliefs, and shared FM knowledge about companies and markets. They were based on clear, 
explicit and shared narratives about the FM firm and its purpose, and modus operandi. They were 
based on operational strengths such as; well understood forms of team autonomy, organization and 
composition, clear and explicit meeting schedules and freedom for informal exchanges. They also 
required robust technology closely matched to FM communication processes and investment tasks. 
These forms of co-ordination did not imply high centralization, but did imply greater unity and 
agreement about shared aims and activities. 
The purposeful organisational processes were the means to allocate, co-ordinate, and mobilize FM 
resources for decision making teams and individuals to exploit. Co-ordinated organisation 
processes and resources and their purposeful interactions were the means to support  FM 
individuals and teams to take well informed ‘bottom up’ stock selection and ‘top down’ asset 
allocation investment decisions (Holland, 2006), to exchange information within and between 
teams, and to produce diversified portfolios with the desired financial performance. In Figure 1, the 
FM organisational processes and contextual resources ‘surrounded’ teams, individuals, and their 
decision routines. They played a role in directing them, to moderate and mediate their responses to 
external stimuli and circumstances. This system created a collective FM firm wide means designed 
to enhance decision conditions in investment teams. In turn, these conditions were expected to 
improve team and individual processes for information search and risk control in investment 
decisions. They enhanced decision processes and places for the creation of information, meaning, 
knowledge, and for learning. In turn, they were expected to improve the chances of FM success via 
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new information production and improved quality of decisions.  
More specifically, the FM organisational processes mobilised resources within FM structure or 
hierarchy to support team conditions. These firm wide interactions were designed to help 
individuals and their investment teams to focus down on information sources about investment 
opportunities and their risks, and make effective use of the information in investment decisions 
(‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’).The FM organisational process (for control and information 
production) and the FM organisational resources and their peer group strengths, and were expected 
to purposefully interact as collective and integrated FM organisational means with each other and 
with characteristics of individuals and teams. The interactions were expected to enhance the 
capabilities of  individuals and FM teams;  to take action, to ‘behave’, to reduce the complexity of 
new information flows, to exchange information, to focus their analysis, to look forward in 
imaginative ways, to find new ideas, and to ‘make sense’ of this qualitative and quantitative 
information in stock selection and asset allocation investment decisions. The combined elements 
were expected to help FMs avoid their own negative behaviour, to exploit the behaviour of others, 
and to perceive value in the actions of others.  
7.1 Interpretation through the theoretical literature on the firm: 
Cyert and March (1963) argued that organisational process is the means for uncertainty 
avoidance and conflict resolution in the firm. Weick (1999) explained that informed 
organisation contexts (as key resources) were required to help individuals and teams make 
sense of equivocal messages, with a multitude of possible meanings in a rapidly changing 
information environment. Organisational process was required to develop, allocate, mobilise 
and exploit resources in the FM firms. Key resources (as in the RBV, Barney, 1991; Fahy, 
2000) were interpreted as the properties of contexts. Excess firm resources or ‘slack’  (Cyert 
and March, 1963) were interpreted as high strengths of the properties of contexts relative to 
internal needs and external competitors. The FM firm wide organisational processes and 
context based resources were integrated means to cope with and reduce the uncertainty 
associated with equity investments (Hellman, p236, 2000). Strengths in team and individual 
characteristics, and of firm properties of knowledge, coherence and matching, were expected 
to play a role in uncertainty avoidance and conflict resolution in the team based and goal 
seeking task sequences (Cyert and March, 1963) of FM investment routines, both ‘top down’ 
and ‘bottom up’. They were also the joint base from which creativity could be stimulated in 
individuals and teams. Teams were the focus of attention because they were the primary area 
for investment decision making.  
 
7.2 Interpretation through the theoretical literature on hierarchy and capital allocation:  
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Stein’s (2002) seminal paper on hierarchy, decision costs and capital allocation is an 
important reference point for this research.  Stein’s  question of  (2002) of ‘how well different 
organizational structures perform in terms of generating information about investment 
projects and allocating capital to these projects’ was investigated relative to banks. Stein 
(2002, Chen et al (2004), Berger et al (2005) and others have focussed on (the centralisation 
of) organisational structure as the primary source of ‘hierarchy’ or decision costs. Chen et al 
(2004)  argued that hierarchy costs arise in (mutual) fund management hierarchies when the 
‘the process of agents fighting for (and potentially not having) their ideas implemented will 
affect agents’ ex ante decisions of what ideas they want to work on’. Stein (2002) argued that 
when hierarchy costs exist in large centralised firms, small organizations ought to outperform 
large ones at tasks that involve the processing of soft information or personal, subjective and 
difficult to verify information. Agents in centralised firms find it difficult to convince others 
of their ideas especially as it is transferred up the organization.  In contrast centralised firms 
are better at incentivising agents to collect and communicate hard or quantifiable information, 
and ought to outperform small firms when processing hard information. 
Some differences to Stein (2002) and Chen et al (2004) can be noted in the behavioural 
theory of fund management firms.  Top management in the FMs asked: “What strategically 
balanced clusters of organizational factors and processes — does the best job of finding new 
information and allocating capital and other resources to competing funds or portfolios?” FM 
decision or hierarchy costs were determined by more than (the centralisation of) 
organisational structure alone, and that the use of hard and soft information was more subtle 
than suggested in Stein’s (2002) model.  The issue of resource allocation was more varied 
and concerned, inter alia, financial capital, pay, knowledge, and top management attention. 
Despite these differences Stein’s analysis is valuable as decision costs such as hierarchy costs 
and ‘soft information’ problems were present in the FMs and influenced their decisions 
(strategic and operational).  
The issue of centralisation illustrates the difference to Stein (2002). Some degree of 
centralised organisation and hierarchy was required to control risk, adverse selection and 
moral hazard at all levels in the FM firms.   However, in the case FMs there was awareness 
that increasing size could lead to high centralisation, rigid bureaucratisation and inflexibility 
of organisational processes. There was awareness that centralising of resource allocation and 
of risk controls, controls over knowledge, and controls over parts of information production 
could lead to sub optimal decision conditions. They could lead to adverse incentives and high 
decision costs and their impact on the use of expertise of individuals in teams and exchange 
of expertise. Decision costs could also arise from limited hierarchy control over FM 
behavioural problems such as bias and overconfidence, and excessive risk taking. Perceived 
decision costs arising from over-centralisation and complexity also included isolated 
information production, limited  exchange between teams and up and down  the hierarchy,  
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misplaced focus on quantifiable sources or ‘soft’ sources alone, emphasis on historic data as 
opposed to future looking information,  all contributing to under performance. These were 
closely related to the hierarchy costs identified by Stein (2002). 
7.3 Seeking a strategic balance: 
The case FMs tried to deal with issues of complexity, risk, soft information, and adverse 
incentives by using, a strategically ‘balanced’ set of organisational, team and individual   
factors. This involved a strategic balance between the various organisational processes for 
control such as: hierarchical control of risk (financial and behavioural); control over 
autonomy; control by using behavioural incentive schemes; control over knowledge creation 
and exchange; all relative to processes for information production and exchange. They also 
sought a balance between organisation processes and allocation of strategic resources. Part of 
the strategic balance emphasised simplicity and clarity in organisational factors such as clear 
philosophy and simple hierarchy. Another part focused on exploiting organisational ‘glue’ as 
shared knowledge, explicit culture, ‘coherence’, and ‘matching’. This allowed the 
development of collective mindfulness’ (Weick 1979, 1995) and of ‘adaptive’ bureaucracies 
which avoided problems arising from high centralisation and complexity. The case FMs 
sought to mimic the conditions of autonomy, choice, of forward looking and of ‘soft’ 
information processing in teams and smaller organisations. They tried to reduce the problems 
of large organisation, and to gain the benefits of large organisation. Adaptive FM 
bureaucracies were based on flexible and effective organisational processes and contextual 
resources with explicit matching and coherence properties (see Section 8 for examples).  
A ‘strategically balanced’ set of these organisational, team and individual factors was 
expected to reduce decision costs in and between teams. Collectively they were expected to 
compensate for or countervail some of the problems caused by centralisation. Collectively the 
strategic balance of organisational factors was expected to determine decision conditions, 
decision costs, information collection incentives, and the kind of information collected by 
FMs. They were expected to encourage the production and transmission of both ‘soft’ and 
‘hard’ information throughout the FM, both up and down the hierarchy and cross hierarchy. 
They also created the conditions in which effective (‘mosaic’) combinations of ‘soft’ and 
‘hard’ information could be combined in FM  (team and individual) judgements about 
investments. 
In Stein’s (2002) terms these choices can be interpreted as a strategic trade off between 
increasing hierarchy costs from organisational controls (for risk, adverse incentives and 
behaviour) and reducing hierarchy costs from flexibility (via  knowledge, coherence and 
matching resources) and desirable team and individual characteristics. This led to reduced net 
hierarchy costs designed to enhance information production and performance at team, 
individual and portfolio levels. FMs firms sought a competitively superior combination of 
organisation processes, resources, teams and individuals to achieve desirable economic costs 
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(‘top down’, cross hierarchy, ‘bottom up’ costs) of decision making. These were intended to 
create the conditions for superior production of information and performance. 
7.4 Prediction: 
If we assume that a such strategic choices have been made and a strategic balance achieved, 
the behavioural theory of FM predicts that the higher the relative co-ordination and 
implementation of FM firm organisation process and the contextual resources, and the higher 
the strengths of properties of investment teams and of individual contextual resources, then 
the higher the chances of creating desirable conditions and processes in investment teams. As 
a result, the theory predicts higher expected mediation and moderation effects of these 
organisational processes and contextual resources during decision making by individuals in 
their investment teams. This is expected to lead to higher quality of FM firm and team 
information search, control, and production processes and to lower decision costs. These 
collective properties of FM, their strengths, and their impact on information production and 
investment decision making in teams, were expected to marginally alter the investment odds 
in the favour of the investment teams. These were expected to help them create investment 
portfolios expected to be robust across a range of potential circumstances, and to produce 
desired performance. High (peer group) relative strengths in these processes and resources 
were the perceived basis for creativity, for competitive advantage, and for beta creation 
(return for risk) and potentially alpha creation (excess return). These organisational processes 
and use of resources could be ineffective, fail or face barriers due to problems with human 
capital, technology, organisation, culture and other factors. These problems are discussed in 
section 9 and could increase hierarchy costs and were the likely basis for much FM 
underperformance (Cuthbertson et al,  2006, 2008 ). 
 
8. The impact of organisational processes and resources on teams and individuals  
Section 8 discusses how FM organisational process and hierarchy and their properties of integration 
and coherence when combined with knowledge and narrative were unifying forces and had a direct 
influence on individuals and teams and their investment decisions. These forms of co-ordination 
and integration did not imply high centralization, but did imply greater unity and agreement about 
shared aims and activities at all levels in the FM firm. The coherence factors encouraged a shared 
‘bottom up’ and a ‘top down’ process of understanding, sense making and agreement about these 
matters. This contrasts with a policy of high centralization and authoritarianism by top 
management. The latter may create high decision costs (Stein, 2002), whereas the former is tailored 
to the creative and autonomous dimensions required in much of FM team and individual behavior. 
This was one way in which large FMs sought to deal with problems of size and complexity and was 
an alternative to a centralizing policy alone. 
8.1 The impact of FM organisational process on individuals (and their qualities)  
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Organisation processes involved FM firm wide co-ordination, exploitation and control of 
individual qualities such as psychological traits, experience, and knowledge.  Individual qualities 
were influenced by FM firm organisation process and context with this contributing to team 
conditions (such as trust and understanding) and decision costs during both ‘top down’ and 
‘bottom up’ investment decision processes.  Psychological traits, states and behavioural errors 
(such as overconfidence and mistaken risk taking) at the level of individuals in teams managing 
specific funds, were mediated by the degree of control from ‘top down’ investment processes and 
by organisational factors or properties such as firm wide knowledge. Incentives to make explicit 
and discuss ‘soft’ information were expected to increase with shared knowledge.  Holland et al 
(2012) discuss how emotional responses and FM prior knowledge were important means whereby 
FMs made collective sense of different but complementary types of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ information. 
Psychological traits of individuals in teams were also mediated by FM firm investment policy and 
type of FM. For example, overconfidence was expected to reduce as one moved from hedge to 
growth, to value to index funds.  The FM firm policy for job security, pay, and degree of 
autonomy, were similar organisational factors which were used to further alter the individual and 
team experience. As incentives became riskier and autonomy increased the likelihood of 
overconfidence errors by individuals could rise, and performance could decline.  As FM firm 
penalties (on individuals and teams) for fund performance failure rose then avoidance of downside 
risks rose and ‘quasi indexing’ were expected to increase (Holland, 2006). There were limitations 
to this FM firm influence; 
Case FM4:  ‘…..there is a reality …behind this organisational structure and process…..you see a lot of individual behaviour by stars and  personal 
characteristics persisting in this highly structured process. .. there are personalities here and stars here with different rationality and different ..skills 
and .. competences...events are dynamic and change all the time with new information coming all the way through and these create dynamics in the 
real business which means the highly structured process is changing all the time’.  
 
 
8.2 The impact of organisational process on team decision conditions, costs and processes 
 
Team conditions and processes were central to fund management. The organisation processes, 
hierarchy and resources, and team and individual contexts (and their resources) illustrated in 
Figure 1 were all intended to enhance decision conditions and atmosphere in investment teams.  
The target team conditions included trust, consensus, understanding, and focus on task. They 
included behavioural tendencies and biases, acceptable behaviour range, shared understanding, 
degree conflict allowed, and shared purpose conditions in teams. They included time and space to 
think and reflect, as well as quick response capabilities. They included the clarity of the investment 
task and goals of the investment team for specific funds under their management. These decision 
conditions in and between teams were deemed critical factors in increasing the chances of success 
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in investment decisions. 
Case FM 7: The members of the FM team face each other and are in regular conversation and in exchange of views…..We therefore seek a good 
atmosphere and focus for the team space and for their interactions. We try to get a mix of introvert and extroverts, youth and age, so that we can 
good interactions and debates using a variety of viewpoints.  
 
Enhanced decision conditions in teams were the basis to improve team processes (in and between 
teams) for control and information search and to improve adaptive capabilities in teams. These 
processes included; improved communications (formal meetings and informal conversations); the 
focussed search for information; exchanging of new information (‘soft’ qualitative and ‘hard’ 
quantitative); encouraging imaginative forward looking (ex ante) search for new ideas; active and 
purposeful argument; controlling behaviour such as managing argument, conflict and risk taking;  
and to subsequently use these processes (in sense making, Weick, 1995) to improve investment 
decisions and performance. Satisficing or use of ‘just enough’ information and analysis (Simon, 
1957) was also noted. The responsive and adaptive capabilities in investment teams were based on 
properties such as shared experience and knowledge in a range of circumstances, and on individual 
psychological characteristics. 
Case FM 7: 
…we use a wide range of information when we have discussions.. we know we need to absorb the information collectively and come to a decision 
and act with conviction…..I like to push people to argue. Someone may shout out some information .... I like to see who responds to it and 
why….We need trust within the team … other team members will back them up if they can provide a good rationale for problems or changed 
decision…..We do not have stars. We prefer to focus on a team effort within a disciplined investment process 
 
Team factors were subject to strategic guidance based on ‘front line’ experience.  
Case FM 13: .. what is the best team size? ..  the UK Fund Management Team is seven…. five core fund managers who make the decisions…  two 
graduates   ….as  human capital investment but ...they need to learn quite a bit. .. teams can get too big to function . we try to get a consensual 
process within them. …we have all these information sources coming into the..team  
Despite the strategic guidance, problems arose with investment teams and it was never clear what 
the optimum design of teams could be. 
Case FM1: When we hire staff we use a range of criteria to guide the search for people … in our teams. …It is not clear what the optimum 
behaviour is at individual or team level. It is.. difficult to have an action plan to influence behaviour in an optimum way...our approach is 
much more …organic here and contingent upon circumstances, except for our approach to recruitment, training and behavioural issues … 
we have tried to manage these.  
 
The expected strengths of investment teams (such as investment committees, and fund specific 
teams) were based: on a high degree of shared knowledge (of companies, markets, and FM 
investment processes); a range of individual psychologies (and understanding of biases); broad 
skills and experiences; shared experiences of many cycles (circumstances); and formal review 
processes for teams and individuals. These strengths were expected to influence individual states 
and create team conditions of high trust, decision consensus capabilities, and improve high quality 
‘conversations’ for the exchange of ‘soft’ information and subtle signals.   
 
FM organisational processes and contexts (organisational, team and individual) were intended to 
be the collective means to control and influence individual and team behaviour such as 
‘overconfidence’ at both ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ levels. They were the means to create an 
atmosphere of trust and understanding in investment teams and to encourage informal 
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‘conversations’ in such groups and between them. They were the means to promote the production, 
exchange and flow of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ information about risk and return within and between 
investment teams (fund specific teams and the investment committee).  They were intended to be 
the joint  means to both create and resolve conflicts in positive ways, and to reduce uncertainty 
(Cyert and March 1963) within, and between fund specific teams, as well as between ‘bottom up’ 
teams and the ‘top down’ investment committee.  
Case FM 3:  ‘..The next thing is to be organised to be able to quickly recognise when these things begin to occur and to act quickly to 
exploit them ..  a lot of this is about organising your meetings and your information systems so they are adaptable so that you can quickly 
discuss and pick up these salient changes in the market behaviour and relate it to your fair value and market value difference and to your 
votes on each stock ’ 
 
FM investment teams, with these team properties and decision conditions and guided by a firm 
wide organisational process and resources, were expected to have higher quality argument 
processes, to conduct fruitful and managed conflict, and to be successful information producers. 
Team members were expected to have lower levels of overconfidence than fund managers 
operating as isolated teams or individuals in FM firms, or individual investors in markets.   As 
team factors such as trust and knowledge increased in strength, then the likelihood of the use of 
poor information and of overconfidence errors could fall, and performance could improve.     
Case FM 7:  ‘We know a lot about companies and how to get information from them…during company visits by our team ….We drill our staff….in 
our company checklist …but we keep an open mind.  Decision-making is collective and even junior fund managers are encouraged to contribute 
ideas - and take responsibility - early. This is facilitated by a generalist approach, with team members cross-covering company visits. Open plan 
offices facilitate communication’ 
 
8.3 The integrated FM organisational system. 
The FM organisation processes, hierarchy and contextual resources were expected to be connected 
together in a purposeful and coherent manner and work as one dynamic and integrated system or 
business model (IIRC, 2011). 
Case  FM4: ‘..fund managers here have learnt over time that there are good internal reasons for the structures and processes to be.. formal. ..we need 
..structure in this investment process because we need people to work together….we have learnt over time that highly structured decision processes, 
good organisational structure and good use of information do have major advantages in.. decision process. This.. enhanced our ability to tell our 
value creation story internally and externally. Our structure and our story help us tie together ...people and ...control bias in behaviour and get the 
best team benefits out of them.   
The organization processes and contexts (organization, team, individual) were linked and 
integrated in a purposeful way through coherence factors such as FM philosophy and knowledge, 
culture (as core beliefs, shared values) and shared aims.  They were linked by connections between 
FM firm goals and the sub goals of investment team areas. FM firm culture in the form of shared 
beliefs (about companies, markets and value), and common norms of behaviour in the FM (eg 
focus on novel information and the client), were at the heart of coherence, and the purposeful 
linking of the factors in Figure 1. Many other dimensions to organisation process enhanced these 
linkages. These included formal and informal communication processes, and the use of FM firm 
‘story’ of how it conducted fund management.  They included the technology for firm wide 
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communication systems and other tangibles such as office layout and building design. For 
example, technology was a critical means to support the organisations processes for FM wide 
control and information production. They were key means to improve communication and 
information exchange throughout the hierarchy and within and between teams and individuals. 
Case FM 2   ‘We use our own advanced technology to communicate global research...  information exchange with ..bottom up process... and the top 
down interactions.......This ... exchanges information around the globe between different analysts, different sector managers and different .. portfolio 
managers. It ..overcomes... problems of distance … in a global FM. .......All internal analysts, all fund managers can see what information has been 
created within a sector or fund management group at any point in time. .......This technology stores research notes by internal analysts, company 
meeting notes,  internal fund manager meeting notes,  news that people have picked up and are transferring around, and our current 
valuations,......We cannot work on a global basis without this formal information exchange......The same information system also flags forthcoming 
company meetings ....Without this system it is hard to see how bottom up research .. could extract value out of these information sources in such a 
systematic way’. 
 
Each case FM had their theory (or conceptual framework) how all of these elements were 
connected together in a purposeful and coherent manner. This explored how many factors such as 
philosophy, organisational structures, functions and processes, human capital and control 
mechanisms all worked together to help the FM to focus down on information about sources of 
risk and return. It explained how the FM managed and exploited these to take actions to create 
value and diversify risk.  
Case FM 2: 
‘We have our own basic theory of fund management… includes the 4P’s of philosophy, people, process, and performance….. Other parts include risk 
management and technology. All these work together and produce performance.  
 
This theory was made explicit in the FM narrative or ‘story’ of how these factors interacted and 
worked together. This became essential for guiding the internal interactions and internal decision 
making and hence for integrating the organisational processes. Boyce (1996) and Boje (2001) 
discuss the role of stories within internal corporate communications. Story telling is used as a 
vehicle for ‘collective centering and collective sense making’ within organisations such as FM 
firms, (Boyce, 1996) but management can exploit story telling in their interests. FM firms also use 
their story in structuring external communications and marketing in markets. Holland (2005, 2009) 
has shown how the ‘value creation story’ was an oral and/or written narrative for firms to disclose 
qualitative information to external markets. 
 
Case FM 7: Our story is clear.... organisation and good discipline are important – in research, in risk management, in investment decision process, in 
team interactions, in taking action. This all leads to educated ..‘bets’ on stocks. If you have a good structure, and a good process for research, risk 
management and investment decisions, and stick to the process, and implement decisions without emotion, and buy and sell according to your 
convictions then the bets will probably come out in your favour.  
 
8.4 Organisation processes and exploiting knowledge resources  
 
Knowledge was a key property or resource of organisational, team and individual contexts and had 
a major impact on team decision conditions and costs. It was developed, mobilised and exploited by 
the organisational process during the investment decision making (routine and creative) process and 
during long term learning and knowledge creation (Holland et al, 2012).  The FMs recognised the 
26 
 
importance of existing FM knowledge about companies, markets and other FMs, and the need to 
ensure that this was widely shared within the FM firm. As a result, considerable organisational 
effort was put into exploiting and transferring existing knowledge through recruitment, training, and 
moving staff around to encourage knowledge exchange. 
Case FM 13:   ‘ ….we reshuffle teams once per year. ... for people in their first, second and third years  at the start of their career. They can add a fresh 
view on how we do things. ....senior people also move around... to develop their experience…. transfer their experience to other people and question 
existing practices and beliefs.  This spreads best practice around and makes staff more rounded and better able to understand other roles.  It freshens up 
teams and people and allows us to match teams to new investment areas and client needs. This all makes our individuals and teams more responsive to 
change’  
The FMs sought low external turnover of quality staff relative to labour markets and high turnover 
of weak or disruptive performers. They also sought internal movement of high quality staff within 
the firm. These were means to protect and develop the human capital resource. Knowledge once 
developed and mobilised was expected to have major impacts on team conditions, information 
production and control processes, and investment decisions. 
FM case 6:  ‘… it is not just external sources of information that are important here… the prime capital here is the human capital. We invest in 
people, in fund managers and internal analysts. This is the single most important element in good stock selection and asset allocation and financial 
performance in fund management’. 
 
FM firm wide knowledge buttressed individual knowledge and other personal factors in controlling 
potential behavioural errors. As personal knowledge increased due to internal knowledge transfer, it 
enhanced the exchange of ‘soft’ information. In addition, the likelihood of overconfidence errors 
could fall, and performance could improve at both top down asset allocation levels and bottom up 
investment processes.  Thus knowledge was at the core of FM sustainable competitive advantages 
and the likelihood of relative success and failure. Key knowledge areas concerned company value 
creation and market valuation processes.  Prior FM knowledge about company value creation was a 
key to understanding company ‘fair’ value, to new information production and hence to many 
investment decision activities in the FM. Holland et al (p575, 2012) noted that; 
‘New information from company 1:1 meetings was interpreted within prior FM knowledge of the existing corporate business model... This could be 
used with the causal links in the company value creation narrative to support the earnings prediction process. The 1:1s also helped the FMs to think 
about their feelings about the company investment situation. … FMs responded to the ‘atmosphere’ of 1:1 interactions, and this generated impressions, 
feelings (of confidence and conviction) concerning the companies’ 
 
FM existing knowledge included ideas about how markets understood company business models and 
fundamentals as the basis for the stock price. It included FM theories of the dynamics of behaviour in 
market and how this created short term variation in market price around FM views of ‘fair’ value. 
This knowledge was used in active ‘gaming’ behaviour by investment teams.  
Case FM 14:   ‘We watch stocks prices every day and we do look at technical analysis... price changes …. We match this with our analysis of company 
economic performance... of gaming by others  to try and see how these might be driving the price changes……Technical analysis of price by itself is no 
good. However, we can learn a lot by analysing how real economic information about a company, and how gaming behaviour, all drive prices 
individually and together. We try to separate out... effects of real economic information about a company, from …gaming behaviour… 
 
 
9.  Fund Manager success and failure           
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Section 9 uses the behavioural theory of FM to explore issues of FM success and failure and new 
ways of researching FM performance. The organisational processes and contextual resources were 
expected to function together in a purposeful FM wide system to generate successful performance 
outcomes. The combined system was the base for creativity and success, especially if relative peer 
group strengths existed in its key components. Weaknesses and failure in these elements and their 
integration was a basis for FM underperformance and failure.  These insights provide new ways of 
investigating FM performance issues.  
9.1   FM creativity and success.   
The case FMs were very aware of the threats to effective internal communication, creativity and the 
production of novel information at team and individual levels caused by organisational form and 
processes. They organised to avoid rigid ‘bureaucratisation’ and negative decision costs (such as 
hierarchical costs, Stein, 2002) by encouraging contextual and process conditions for creativity in 
which forward looking (ex ante) and unique ‘soft’ or qualitative information produced by 
individuals could be valued, made explicit, analysed and used in teams and in the wider FM firm.  
The combined FM system was the base for creativity, especially if relative peer group strengths 
existed in its key resources and processes.  
Case FM 13: 
Consultants ...and trustees … ask us, what is your edge?..  you have.. no more information than anyone else. ....We argue, ... we.. have a structure 
which allows us to make better decisions on the basis of our information. This ... is about our team structures and decision processes. ... it is the blend 
of team that counts and the size of the team that counts. This allows us to process information quicker than the average person. It allows us to process 
it better than the bureaucratic fund management team which is too top heavy. We can see the wood from the trees. This helps us make choices in our 
stock selection and helps us build up stakes based on informed position. 
 
The case FM findings match the findings on creativity and context in the wider organizational 
literature. As Heuer (p75, 1999) noted ‘new but appropriate ideas are most likely to arise in an 
organisational climate that nurtures their development and communication’. Ford and Gioia (2000) 
found both context and decision process were sources of factors that influenced the creativity of 
managers’ decisions (in commercial firms) and especially the novelty and value dimensions of 
creativity.  Amabile et al. (1996) argued that dimensions of the work environment contributed to the 
capacity of individuals and groups to be creative.  These include supportive organisations, reward 
systems, supportive supervisors, and work groups valuing creative effort.  They include autonomy 
and resources for individuals and teams, as well as removal of impediments such as rigid structures. 
Creativity in FM individuals and their investment teams involved exploiting peer group strengths 
in contextual resources at FM firm and team levels. These creative organisational resources 
included a strong research orientation, adaptive external information sources, tailored work 
incentives, time and space to think and reflect, valuation of creative efforts etc as well as the 
unique characteristics of individuals (open mindedness, imaginative etc). Creativity also 
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involved ‘breaking away’ from existing structures, routine processes and established conceptual 
frames and knowledge (Nonaka & Toyama, 2005, Holland et al 2012). As a result, variation and 
adaptability were built into routines, meeting cycles, forms of analysis, into behaviour in teams 
(challenge culture, scepticism, autonomy), and into the range of experiences and psychological 
outlooks of individuals.  Creative elements were added by varying the working day and by 
encouraging informal conversations and meetings.  Each FM sought its own unique balance 
between routine and creative elements in the pursuit of its aims. There was tension between 
routine and creativity aims and processes. Creative activity in  immediate and ongoing 
investment decision processes  by individuals and their investment  teams involved, inter alia,  
use of,  and knowledge of how to use:  flexible routines; active and challenging team 
conversations and  of ‘positive’ behaviour;  and ‘brainstorming’ in investment teams. They 
involved intense probing by investment teams of investee companies, pressurizing problem 
companies and noting their response. They also included a probing external research capability, 
and ability of individuals and their investment teams to recognize when they were receiving 
urgent and often value significant feedback from stock markets and from the ‘market for 
information’.   
The above were the combined organisational means for the case FMs to encourage creative 
conditions in investment teams, and in their associated information search and control processes. 
They were means to significantly alter the odds in their favour and to create robust investment 
portfolios expected to produce beta and potentially alpha in range of circumstances. Organising 
for creativity, for competitive advantage and for beta and alpha creation was based on perceived 
superior dimensions or strengths to FM contextual resources and processes. This reveals the 
close perceived links between organising for creativity, for competitive advantage and for alpha 
creation. 
Case FM 2: Where are our competitive advantages? They lie in our price and intrinsic value philosophy, in our high quality, globally organised 
investment organisation and process, in our globally organised proprietary research, in our optimal approach to portfolio construction where both 
bottom up and top down views of risk are integrated, in our cutting edge risk analytics. They lie in the expertise and range of our employee 
capabilities, and strong knowledge of our clients. These ..lead to superior risk adjusted performance.  
  
In the search for strategic balance between the organisation processes, and use of resources, FMs 
recognised they were more likely to find ‘second best’ solutions. These allowed FMs to perform 
as ‘best we can’ as close as possible to beta return goals with the occasional alpha performance.  
The FMs combined a form of strategic satisficing behaviour (Simon, 1957) with a search for 
reduced decision costs (Stein, 2002). 
Case FM 13: All of these mechanisms, ..organisational structure, layout of offices, the teams, ..top down and bottom up investment process, ad 
hoc meetings,  formal meetings,  sector meetings are somewhat fuzzy ways of exchanging information. .....the US consultants ... ...want.. it all to 
be absolutely clear. However, it is not clear what is the ..optimum structure ... Our combination of small teams, one floor ....ad hoc meetings, 
formal meetings and ..global sector meetings is the best we can do at present. They can all be seen as a... rule of thumb.  
 
29 
 
9.2 FM weaknesses, underperformance and failure  
These organisational interactions and resource use could fail or face barriers due to problems 
with human capital, technology, organisation, competition, culture and with many other factors.  
These were likely to be the source of problems with decision conditions and costs for individuals 
and teams leading to the poor financial performance reported by many FMs (Cuthbertson et al 
2006, 2008). 
Case FM 6 :  What are the barriers to effective fund management.. stock selection and asset allocation decisions, to developing information and 
to effective action? ..there are three main areas of barriers. Number one,  people. ... people management skills and behaviour of individuals can 
be major barriers .. Communication is vital. This can be impeded by a lack of lateral thinking... by a lack of prioritisation or a lack of sense of 
urgency .. Number three... technical or system barriers. If the system crashes in the middle of an important company or market event then this is 
a very severe problem.  
 
The FM cases revealed empirical patterns for weaknesses and problems in the many elements of 
fund management. These revealed patterns in the drivers of FM underperformance. More 
generally, problems with top management quality could lead to problems with strategic review 
processes, strategic choices and strategic ‘balance’ with these leading to continuing problems 
with organisational processes and contextual resources. These in turn created the problematic 
organisational conditions to exacerbate weaknesses at team and individual levels leading to 
higher decision costs, higher operating costs, higher risk, lower returns and hence portfolio 
underperformance. More specifically, weaknesses in the FM investment process could arise 
from weaknesses in the properties of FM organisational processes. Table 1, Appendix 2 provides 
empirical details on such problems. Organisational process problems were based on FM wide 
weaknesses such as poorly understood FM philosophy, and culture, and limited sharing of 
beliefs and FM knowledge about companies and markets. They were based on limited narratives 
about the FM firm and its purpose, and modus operandi. Problematic FM bureaucracies 
included, inter alia, complex FM hierarchies, with high centralisation, restricted autonomy and 
narrow control boundaries, poor exchange of knowledge, poorly designed incentive schemes, 
high staff turnover, and inflexible routines. They were also based on operational weaknesses 
such as poorly understood forms of team organization and composition, erratic meeting 
schedules and limited freedom for informal exchanges. Problems with technology reduced the 
effectiveness of FM communication and control processes. Individual weaknesses and 
combinations of weaknesses in organizational processes, as outlined in Table 1 in Appendix 2, 
contributed to underperformance. 
Problems also arose from weaknesses in resources for case FMs. More specifically they arose 
from weaknesses in the properties of contexts (firm, team, and individual) and process, by where 
they arose (location), and how they arose (systematic and connected, unconnected, key 
component).  Location weaknesses included under investment in functions such as research and 
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staff training. Behavioural weaknesses arose in areas such as mismatched attitudes to risk, high 
levels of overconfidence, hubris, and bias etc. relative to the chosen information niche, 
investment universe and risk universe.  Collective and connected weaknesses also arose. For 
example, weaknesses in internal risk control systems and in staff recruitment and training 
exacerbated behavioural weaknesses at team and individual levels such as mismatched attitudes 
to risk, high levels of overconfidence, hubris, and bias  relative to the chosen information niche, 
investment and risk universe for specific investment portfolios. Systematic and connected set of 
weaknesses in the FM formed a collective exposure for the FM to downturns in economies and 
markets and during major crises. Weaknesses also developed as major failure in one key central 
element or component of the FM system. A significant failure in periodic review about say risk 
control alone could undermine all other strengths.  
In Stein’s (2002) terms, top management and strategic weakness can lead to errors in strategic 
choices and increasing hierarchy costs arising from rigid and sub optimal controls (for risk, 
incentives and behaviour) and from inflexible knowledge and other contextual resources. This 
can lead to high decision costs such as hierarchy costs seriously impeding (‘soft’ and ‘hard’) 
information production and performance at team, individual and portfolio levels.  For example, 
inflexible bureaucracies that emphasised formal reporting and quantitative measure were 
expected to negatively affect FM individuals forward looking (ex ante) decisions of what were 
(value) relevant new ideas to work on. These economic costs were expected to increase in 
poorly organised FMs with inflexible organisational processes, limited contextual resources, and 
problems with teams and individuals. This could be the case if individuals were making 
judgements about subjective, qualitative information, and if they sought to publicly 
communicate this information within teams, across teams, up or down through the hierarchy, or 
via FM reporting technology. If these organisational problems were combined with knowledge 
and incentive problems outlined in table 1, Appendix 2, they were expected to exacerbate 
problems with risk control and behaviour. These could deepen problems with the generation and 
exchange of forward looking qualitative information and decrease its information content in 
teams, between teams, and within the hierarchy. This reveals the problems of managing the 
negative and positive aspects of organisational or hierarchy costs. 
 
9.3 Developing new tests for success and failure. 
 
The behavioural theory of FM may be of use in advancing the more conventional empirical 
research programme concerning FM performance.  Relative peer group strengths in the 
properties of individual elements as resources and processes were identified as the basis for 
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FM success. Various FM specific combinations of organisation process, organisation 
contextual resources, and team factors were considered to be the source of FM advantage and 
success. Strengths and weaknesses arose from strategic choices with these depending on the 
quality of FM top management. Weaknesses in the FM investment process could arise from 
weaknesses in organisational processes (or in the properties of FM organisational processes) 
and from weaknesses in resources (or the properties of contexts, firm, team, and individual).  
The grounded theory thus suggests new ways to think about and test issues of FM 
performance. The grounded theory suggests that underperformance at fund portfolio, and FM 
firm level is driven by a linked cluster of these (FM firm) system based factors rather than 
one or two traditional and unconnected research variables such fund size, style, human capital 
characteristics track records, training costs, and staff turnover. Given the poor financial 
performance by many FMs when delivering investment services to investors (Cuthbertson et 
al 2006, 2008), the role of the behavioural theory of FM in linking such disparate 
factors/measures and suggesting new linked factors/measures may be critical to performance 
studies. Jones et al (2011) make a similar point when they argue that FM firm, fund, and 
manager characteristics should be combined with conventional performance analysis in 
identifying superior active managers.  
10. Summary and Conclusions                      
  
The paper has made a contribution to empirical understanding of FM by described a novel 
behavioural theory of the FM firm. This provides a development of prior research by Holland 
and Doran (1998), Hellman (2001 ), Arsnwald (2001),  Holland (2003, 2006), and Holland 
and Johanson (2003) concerning fund management. The FM theory suggests new ways to 
think about and test issues of FM performance. Variety in FM styles can also be investigated 
in the same way using the behavioural theory of the FM firm. Appendix 3 uses the theory to 
provide insights on variety in FM firm types and investment policies. The evidence on FM 
success and failure in section 9 also demonstrates the variety in FM firm’s ability to execute 
their policies. 
The theoretical literature was used to interpret the empirical findings. In the behavioural theory 
of the FM firm, such firms were developed to exploit and overcome the problems of investing 
faced by individuals in complex financial markets and in a world of changing economic 
processes in companies. The purposeful and highly co-ordinated FM organisational process, the 
flexible hierarchy, the external and internal FM contexts (organisational, teams and individual 
and their properties, and relative strengths), when combined with matching and desirable 
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investment team conditions and processes, were interpreted as evolutionary (Nelson & Winter 
1982) responses to uncertainty. They were developed in a common institutional setting (Scott 
and Meyer, 1994; Scott, 2001) and provided a FM firm specific and investment team focus for 
interpretation of events and production of new information.  Holland et al (2012) illustrates how 
these were the result of long term FM learning and knowledge creation processes.  
The paper also argued that the FM organisational process and organisation contextual resources 
were required to help individuals and teams make sense of messages, with a multitude of 
possible meanings in a rapidly changing information environment (Weick, 1999). Strengths in 
organisational processes, hierarchy,  and contextual resources were likely to lead to reduced 
fund manager firm ‘hierarchy costs’ noted by Stein (2002), and Chen et al (2004).  
Organisational process was required to mobilise and exploit key resources and excess resources 
in the FM firms (as in RBV, Barney, 1991; Fahy, 2000). The FM theory had many links to Cyert 
and March’s ‘behavioural theory of the firm’ (1963).  Excess firm resources or ‘slack’ were 
interpreted as high strengths of the properties of contexts and processes relative to internal needs 
and external competitors. The FM firm wide organisational processes, hierarchies and resource 
contexts were integrated means to cope with and reduce the uncertainty associated with equity 
investments (Hellman, p236, 2000). When combined they were important organisational means 
for uncertainty avoidance and conflict resolution in the manner suggested by Cyert and March 
(1963).   
The above indicates that the paper has also made a contribution to the literature by using 
existing theories in new ways, both individually and collectively. Golden-Biddle and Locke, 
(2007) distinguish between what they call ‘field based stories’ and ‘theoretical stories’. This 
paper revealed a robust and novel theoretical framework to interpret the FM case data and the 
distinctive empirical patterns emerging from this data. The paper illustrates how these diverse 
literatures can be linked together via the analysis of the empirical patterns to form a coherent 
‘theoretical narrative’ for FM. The aim was not to develop these individual theory frameworks, 
but to position the paper and its issues relative to relevant literature and to demonstrate their 
collective power in interpreting the combined phenomena, in suggesting new areas and 
directions for research,  and in contributing to further policy development.  
The paper is an example of new research agenda in finance based on qualitative methods 
(Burton, 2007) and new uses of the literature. This joint theoretical and empirical analysis 
formed a new conceptual framework for understanding FMs and the empirical patterns observed 
in the cases. This is important in developing thought in finance and on financial institutions.  
This approach also offers opportunities to develop Stein’s (2002) seminal paper on how different 
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organizational structures in financial institutions ‘perform in terms of generating information 
about investment projects and allocating capital to these projects’. Models of organisation, 
resources, process, teams, individuals, decision costs, information production and capital 
allocation underlie many different financial firms such as banks, private equity and venture 
capital, and insurance and pension fund firms (Stein, 2002; Chen et al 2004; Chen et al 2014).  
The theoretical analysis in the paper demonstrates that FM context, process and dynamics can be 
explained, in part, within conventional theory of the firm, organisational theory, behavioural 
finance and other related literature. The FM firm is thus similar to many non financial firms in 
this respect. The joint development and exploitation of this new literature and the Stein (2002) 
developed literature, with their new insights into financial institutions, has become an urgent 
matter in response to the post 2007-09 financial crisis environment.   
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Appendix 1 – Table of case companies 
Firm  Number of 
interviews 
Number of firm 
representatives 
& dominant FM style 
Language spoken Number Of 
researchers 
present 
Type of 
 archival data 
Prior Research 
meetings =  R 
Trustee Meetings  = T 
Case FM1 
10/12/2004 
2 hours 
Frankfurt 
Germany 
1 Chief Investment officer 
 
Value 
English 1 Public (web) FM 
firm and fund case 
data on background, 
purpose, 
philosophy,  
operations 
R= 2  
 
Case FM2 
13/12.2004 
3 hours 
Frankfurt  
Germany 
1 1 
Senior managing director 
 
Value 
English  1 
 
+ 6 Inv 
Committee 
members 
Cf  above R= 2  
 
 
T = 10 
Case FM3 
14/12/2004 
2 hours 
Frankfurt 
Germany 
1                   1 
Managing Director, Head 
of equity research 
 
Growth 
English  1 Cf  above R= 2  
 
Case FM4 
17/12/2004 
2 hours 
Dusseldorf 
Germany 
2 Director of  European 
equities, 
 Equity product specialist, 
Growth 
English 1 Cf  above R= 2  
 
Case FM5 
6/9/2004, 2 hours 
Edinburgh UK 
1 Chief Investment Officer 
 
Value 
English 1  Cf  above R= 2  
 
Case FM6 
13/9/2004, 2 hours 
Edinburgh UK 
1 Chief Investment Officer 
 
Value 
English 1 Cf  above R= 2  
 
Case FM7 
4/11/2005 
2 Hours 
Glasgow UK 
1 Head of Global Equities 
 
Value 
English  1  Cf  above R= 2  
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Case FM8 
Tokyo, 2 hours 
April 2006 
 
One  3 main interviewees. 2 
senior FM, 1 investor 
relations. Many other team 
members present.  
Value 
English Four Public (web) FM 
firm and fund case 
data on background, 
purpose, 
philosophy,  
operations 
R= 1  
 
Case FM9 
Tokyo 
April 2006 
One  2 main interviewees, a 
senior portfolio manager 
and a head of analysts.  
Other team members 
present  - Value 
English Four     Ditto R= 1  
 
 Case FM10 
Tokyo 2 hours 
April 2006 
One  4 main interviewees, the 
senior manager, 3 
FMs/analysts.  Other team 
members present 
Growth 
English Four     Ditto R= 1 
 
Case FM11 
10 x 2 hours 
2010 to 2012 
In Glasgow, UK 
10 
meetings 
Fund Manager + 
Head of Charities 
English  
 
 
1 
+ 6 Inv 
Committee 
members 
Cf  above  
R= 2  
R=1 1998 
T = 10  2010-12 
Case FM12 
15 x 2 hours 
2008 to 2012 
In Glasgow, UK 
15 
meetings 
Fund Manager + 
Relationship manager  
 
Value 
English 
 
1 
+ 6 Inv 
Committee 
members 
Cf  above R= 2  
T= 15 
Case FM13 
13/09/2004 
28/05/2012 
16 x 2 hours 
Edinburgh 
16 
meetings 
Three Fund managers 
 
Thematic 
English 1 
+ 6 Inv 
Committee 
members 
Cf  above R = 3 
1993, 2004, 2011 
 
T= 16 
2002-2008 
Case FM14 
21/4/2006 
1.5 hours 
Edinburgh UK 
One Senior Director of equity 
investment 
 
Growth 
 English 1 Cf  above R= 2  
 
Case FM15 
 
London UK 
 
 
Two 
March 199 
4 
May 2005 
Director of UK  equities 
 
Special Situations 
English 1 Cf  above & 
Extensive case 
development from 
private and public 
sources for teaching 
purposes 
R= 2  
March 1994 & 
May 2005 
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Appendix 2                           Table 1 
 
Problems with organisational control processes involved; individual weakness – and lack of strategic balance in the following processes; 
 
• Strategic review, learning processes and strategic choice processes not exist and not challenge existing structures, processes. 
• There is no strategic balance between the organisational processes, and no balance of  these  with strategic  resources – relative to firm and fund aims - these 
factors, at times, operated independently of each other, they did not lead to success 
• There was high centralisation, rigid bureaucratisation and inflexibility of organisational processes (for risk control,  knowledge exchange, & resource allocation) 
• These can create high decision costs or hierarchy costs (Stein, 2002, Chen et al 2004), in the form of; 
 
• Complex organisational hierarchies and rigid organisational  structures creating complex authority and responsibility chains  
• Heavily bureaucratised FM firms that focus too much on quantitative (ex post) information production, formal risk controls and formal (adverse) behaviour 
controls 
•  - and lose sight of the potential benefits of ‘soft factors’ such as qualitative forward looking information, of individual judgement, of informal conversations, and 
active team argument and debate. 
 
• FM firm wide problems of organising to control behaviour, risk, and the degree of independence allowed in the FM investment teams and individuals. 
• such as top management not fully accepting formal risk management as part of the  FM culture and philosophy 
• The focus is on reputation risk rather than funds and investment risk 
 
• This can lead to limited attention and limited (conceptual and technological) means to measure and report risk at portfolio and firm levels and to report to senior 
management, fund managers and clients.  
• It can lead to poor internal and external accountability of and governance of (risks taken, valuation methods, and performance of) teams and individuals – relative 
to ‘best practice’ 
 
Problems with organisational Control processes for behavioural incentive schemes; 
 
• FM incentive and pay schemes not  based on cumulative multi-year performance criteria and are mis-aligned with  FM firm aims and portfolio aims and 
investment horizons 
• FM incentive schemes with immediate rather than deferred pay and wealth benefits 
 
Problems with organisational control, development, transfer and allocation of knowledge, and other resources included 
• Strategic review, learning processes and strategic choice processes not exist and not challenge existing knowledge, resources 
• Personnel policies,  human capital,  and knowledge development policies being poorly developed, informal and implicit, and poorly related to FM firm aims and 
portfolio aims 
• Knowledge of - investee company business models, models of market use of information, of portfolio & security valuation,  and of market pricing mechanisms - 
•  - based on of beliefs, being implicit and not formally stated, unchallenged, not tested over large data sets, varying circumstances and during ongoing use. 
• Absence of tested and ‘best practice’ valuation methodologies and procedures and of robust internal controls over internal and external financial reporting. 
• Powerful individuals (as ‘stars’) controlling the knowledge agenda (by arguing that FM is an ‘art’ and not a science)  
• Leading to problems with these models when vast amounts of complex data are being processed and when circumstances change rapidly. 
• Leading to investment policies and portfolios not being robust relative to a range of economic circumstances 
• Poor understanding of own FM firm business model, poor ability to communicate internally and externally 
• Problems of mis-matching of above knowledge to chosen investment universe, preferred information niches, investment aims  and funds/products 
 
• Above knowledge and incentive problems combine 
• Leading to problems with training, recruitment, losing/sacking competent staff,  and promotion  
• Higher risk taking than clients / savers expected, consistent valuation problems with portfolios and reporting of 
• And to major underperformance at individual, team and portfolio levels 
 
Problems with resource allocation processes, organisation information production processes and with teams involved 
 
• Operational weaknesses such as poorly understood forms of (investment, research and trading) team organization and composition, erratic meeting schedules and 
limited freedom for informal exchanges.  
• Historic, inflexible allocation of resources (research, knowledge, financial, risk control) thinly spread across a wide range of portfolios and investment products 
 
• These team based problems and resource problems could combine with FM firm wide control problems above 
• To create poor allocation of resources  to - and poor focusing down of research and analysis - on perceived information sources and advantages – for specific 
portfolios or investment products with distinct investment styles. 
• To exacerbate individual behavior weaknesses such as over confidence, hubris, and lack of adaptability.  
• To exercise weak control over such behavioral issues such as overconfidence and herd behavior 
• To use FM ‘stars’ (internal, external) as sole reference point for action and behavior with limited skepticism allowed. 
 
• This behavior could lead to other risk based problems such as too much concentrated risk or too diversified portfolios 
• relative to portfolio aims and FM perceived  information advantages (concerning  investee companies & markets) 
• And to excessive trading and turnover in the portfolios.  Hence underperformance likely. 
Problems with technology, data analysis and communication systems 
• Such as complex, costly and changing technology for communication, reporting, storage and analysis of  data 
• Such problems with technology further reduced the effectiveness of FM communication and control processes within and between teams.  
• Similar technology problems also reduced the effectiveness of data analysis and formal testing of models (for valuation, for companies & markets). 
• These combined with rapid change and the knowledge control issues above to encourage use of untested models to analyze data and to make decisions. 
• Hence underperformance likely. 
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Appendix 3 - Variation in FM and choices about qualitative/quantitative and theoretical/heuristic 
approaches to investment decision making 
 
The internal FM strategic context was manifest as FM philosophy, FM top management and board knowledge and 
capabilities, core beliefs, and shared values. It was also manifest as FM firm aims (goals) and strategic choices about FM 
organisation and process. Strategic context gave clear purpose to operational investment decisions by investment teams. 
Variation in the strategic contexts was the one of the primary contextual driver of differences in FM style or peer group 
type. The external environment was where the top management of the FM chose its preferred information niche, 
investment universe, risk universe, and investment goals for the whole firm and variations on these themes for specific 
investment teams and portfolios (Holland & Doran 1998; Holland, 2006).  
 
Section 5 shows many common features of routine and structured FM investment decision making. However much 
variation arose in the above investment decisions especially in the choice of mix of qualitative and quantitative methods 
in the case FM. Variation also arose in the use of finance theory, heuristics and own rules and knowledge concerning  
investment decision making.  
Case FM 11: 
We try to take the emotion out of investment decisions and our assessment of risk versus reward. …..We use a range of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to assess the reward we expect our investments to generate. We use rigorous valuation techniques to arrive at a valuation for these returns. 
….This is compared against a large number of risk factors…..there are many objective and subjective company and industry risk factors……Our 
approach to  evaluating risk and reward is the way we think we can generate superior risk adjusted returns over the long term 
 
The case FMs were acutely aware that they did not know the future. They used a range of responses to deal with 
uncertainty in decision making and to diversify their information sources and decision models. In both stock selection 
and asset allocation decisions they used a mix of heuristic rules, finance theory, own theory, and (incomplete) new 
information to make investment decisions under uncertainty.  The case FMs also made choices concerning the extent to 
which structured decision processes were driven by numbers based on the decision logic of valuation theory (say NPV or 
options models) and modern portfolio theory (MPT), or were driven by experience,  judgment and intuition (or by a 
combination of these).  The FM strategic context, core beliefs and philosophy drove such choices (also see Holland, 
2006).  
For example, in the case of asset allocation, the case FMs used a range of information sources in their portfolio 
construction decisions and they varied in their use of theory.  Holland (2006) notes that FMs used  the historic numbers 
((average return, variance, covariance, weightings) required in Modern Portfolio theory (MPT) to project forward 
expected sector and portfolio returns and sources of risk  diversification. The future was unlikely to fully match the past 
numbers and so the FM updated forecasts of portfolio risks and return using new macro and sector forecasts.  Case FMs 
added further insights from the ‘new facts’ of finance (Momentum, over reaction, mean reversions, small firm effect, 
Cochrane, 1999) and assumed that some longer term empirical patterns in market prices were predictable. They used this 
as new information to forecast expected sector and portfolio returns and sources of risk diversification. FMs that 
preferred this information set were normally referred to as a ‘Quantitative’ FMs (Holland, 2006 p 312).  Other case FMs 
were using increasingly subjective information in asset allocation. If they had a strong preference for subjective 
judgments based on the new macro forecasts, ‘new facts’ and behavioural finance and made little use of the MPT 
numbers they were normally referred to as a ‘Qualitative’ FMs.  
In the case of stock selection, the case FMs also used a range of information sources in their stock decisions and they 
varied in their use of valuation theory and set of valuation models. FM knowledge about, and a ‘ mosaic’ of private and 
public information about an investee company, were used to estimate numbers for important valuation variables, within a 
3 to 4 year ‘forecastable horizon’.  Looking beyond this forecastable horizon, the knowledge advantage was the basis for 
an act of faith in FM judgement concerning future value arising in the company beyond this horizon (Holland, 2006, 
p306).  A set of valuation models was used to explore the implications of the information for valuation.  Each valuation 
model (say NPV, payback or P:E) used slightly different information sources and each model had information 
deficiencies. The use of 3 or 4 models and the convergence of their valuations increased FM confidence in the valuations. 
Divergences revealed where the key information problems were and where a new search should begin. The case FMs 
argued they were diversifying model and information risk by such behaviour. Their preferred use of a specific set of 
‘house’ models depended on FM culture, core beliefs and investment philosophy.  Walker et al (2004) and Iman et al 
(2008) note the range of valuation models in use by analysts.  Iman et al (2008) argued ‘analysts' actual usage of 
valuation models also requires an understanding of social and economic context and motivations’. 
In all of the current set of FM cases (and in the cases in Holland (2006)), there was recognition that the FM stock 
selection or asset allocation investment decision problems could not be solved by numbers, valuation theory or MPT 
alone, especially when there was strong or sole reliance on public domain information. The structured stock selection and 
asset allocation decision processes, and organisation processes and supporting contexts, were designed to make full use 
of all available information. They also provided a working base from which the insights of valuation theory, MPT theory, 
econometric theory, as well as FM firm specific theory and proprietary knowledge, could be implemented according to 
FM preferences and beliefs.  
 
